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The on-going crisis of the eurozone is calling its continued existence into doubt, and raising
questions on whether it can function effectively. The view of the nature of the eurozone crisis
as arising from ‘design faults’ of the Economic and Monetary Union and a balance of
payments crisis with large current account imbalances between countries is developed. The
policy remedies (in the form of the ‘fiscal compact’) which are being put into place will not
work in their own terms and will make the economic performance of the eurozone countries
worse. Some Keynesian remedies for the crisis in terms of alternative policy proposals for the
operation of the Economic and Monetary Union are outlined.
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Remedies for the eurozone crisis: quack and otherwise
Malcolm Sawyer
1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that there is a crisis of the eurozone with its continued existence
called into doubt, and questions raised on whether it can function effectively. In this paper we
outline a view of the nature of the eurozone crisis which can be summarised as arising from
‘design faults’ of the Economic and Monetary Union and a balance of payments crisis with
large current account imbalances between countries. In section 3 we argue that the policy
remedies (in the form of the ‘fiscal compact’) which are being put into place will not work in
their own terms and will make the economic performance of the eurozone countries worse. In
section 4, we sketch some Keynesian remedies for the crisis in terms of alternative policy
proposals for the operation of the Economic and Monetary Union.
2. The nature of the eurozone crisis
There can be little doubt that there is a Eurozone crisis. At one level, there are economic and
financial crises, high levels of unemployment and recession in many of the countries of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At another level, there is a crisis of the Economic
and Monetary Union with many now doubting whether it can continue in its present form and
if it does whether it would inevitably involve continuing severe unemployment. The focus of
this paper is on Eurozone crisis in the second sense (without doubting the severity of the first
and indeed the degree to which the first is arising from the second). In other papers (for
example, Arestis and Sawyer, 2010a, 2010b) we have talked of the ‘design faults’ of the
EMU and also of its ‘dysfunctional nature’. We have argued that the Eurozone crisis should
be viewed through the lens of the design and nature of EMU, and not through that of ‘bad
behaviour’ by some member governments. These ‘design faults’ can be seen as related to
many writers who warned (in the 1990s) that the EMU would be subject to many strains and
stresses through the way it was constructed and the policy framework put forward (notably
the Stability and Growth Pact with attempted constraints on national government budget
deficits and the independence of the European Central Bank). Some pointed to the ‘optimal
currency area’ (OCA) literature, and the lack of correspondence between the criteria of that
literature and the conditions in the Eurozone. The OCA literature had highlighted that the
formation of a single currency removes a country’s ability to change its exchange rate (in
case of fixed exchange rate) or a market adjustment process (in the case of floating exchange
rate) in the face of ‘shocks’ to the economy. For example, a downturn in the demand for a
country’s products can be adjusted for through a depreciation of the exchange rate. The OCA
literature pointed to alternative adjustment processes such as price flexibility and factor
mobility, and doubt was cast on the scale of labour mobility in the Eurozone (apart from any
issue over the desirability of large scale migration). The lack of an EMU level fiscal policy
and transfers was also noted by many, which could have acted to cushion the impact of
downswings in individual countries and also served to redistribute income between countries.
The role of the central bank (European Central Bank, ECB) was a matter of concern in at
least two ways (leaving aside issues over ‘independence’ of central bank – see Arestis and
Sawyer, 2010a). First, the operation of monetary policy in the form of the setting of a policy
interest rate raised concerns over the ‘one size fits all’ problem. This is an inevitable issue
relating to monetary policy in that monetary policy involves the setting of an interest rate
which applies across the whole of the currency area, and in diverse economy the interest rate
appropriate for the conditions in one part of the area may not be appropriate for other parts.
The extent of the problem depends on matters such as the degree of convergence of the
business cycle and of inflationary conditions, and the similarities between the regions of the
currency area in the workings of their economies and the transmission of monetary policy.
Second, the ECB was an EMU-level body, whereas fiscal policy was operated by national
governments (subject in principle to the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP, on
the size of budget deficits, which were in the outturn frequently broken). Within a national
state, there is usually a close relationship between the fiscal authority (central government)
and the monetary authority (central bank). The monetary authority will always accept central
government (and other levels of government) debt as collateral in exchange for currency, and
central government debt is underpinned by its acceptance by the central bank. Further,
directly or indirectly, the central bank will always monetise a budget deficit if required, and
the central government will always be able to finance its deficit and its debt position through
the central bank’s willingness to supply currency to the central government. In this position,
the central government can always meet its debt obligations and need never default, provided
that the debt is denominated in the national currency. In the EMU, the ECB is not obligated
to accept the debt of member national governments as collateral, and is explicitly prohibited
from monetising national government deficits.
Others pointed to the current account imbalances between member countries, and the lack of
mechanisms through which those imbalances could be resolved without resort to deflation in
the deficit countries. A country can run a trade deficit provided that other countries are
prepared to lend to it. The current account deficit covering the trade deficit, interest and
related payments on borrowing would then tend to rise (relative to GDP). Apart from any
fickleness of capital inflows, there is the problem of financing rising current account deficits.
A fixed exchange rate regime (which a single currency is par excellence) does not permit the
use of the exchange rate changes to respond to a current account deficit. At some stage, a
country with a large trade deficit is likely to encounter difficulties in financing the current
account deficit, and yet in the absence of the ability to change the nominal exchange rate will
be pushed towards deflation to lower income and imports and to lower domestic prices (to
change the real exchange rate).
The pattern of current account deficits and surpluses also involved, of course, a pattern of
capital account surpluses and deficits. Given the pattern of current account deficits and
surpluses, this implied as a broad generalisation lending by Northern European countries and
borrowing by Southern European countries. The imbalances of current account positions and
their development prior to the financial crisis is illustrated in Figure 1 where the current
account position relative to GDP (in per cent) for the original 12 eurozone members are
given. The creation of the Eurozone facilitated that pattern of lending and borrowing in that
within a single currency area neither the lenders nor the borrowers faced exchange rate risks.
Further, for the lending countries interest rates (particularly in nominal terms) were
significantly lower than previously experienced. There appeared to be little difficulty in the
deficit countries borrowing to cover their current account deficits.
Figure 1 near here
The Maastricht convergence criteria referred to similar inflation rates, interest rates, stability
of exchange rate, and budget deficit and government debt levels. There was much concern
expressed as to how far these convergence criteria were the relevant ones, and how far there
were important convergences and divergences, which were left unmentioned with little
apparent attention paid to them by the policy makers. There was little consideration of the
convergence of cycles in economic activity, which is particularly relevant for the operation of
a ‘one size fits all’ macroeconomic policies. Whilst there was a requirement for convergence
of inflation rate at a particular time, there was no requirement for the convergence of
expectations on and attitudes to inflation nor to the wage and price setting mechanisms and
their implications for the inflationary processes. These omissions were to come to haunt the
EMU in that there were significant divergences of inflation between member countries with
consequences for the evolution of relative competitiveness. There were the more general
omission of the compatibility of different general policy outlooks (e.g. role of industrial
intervention policies, perspectives on macroeconomic policies including fiscal policy), of
industrial structures (e.g. with regard to export performance and competitiveness), and
institutional arrangements (e.g. with regard to operation of labour markets).
The Economic and Monetary Union was formed without sufficient consideration being given
to whether there was sufficient convergence amongst the member countries to warrant the
operation of a single currency. There were many dimensions of convergence/divergence,
which were over-looked: we have pointed here to lack of attention to convergence of business
cycle and economic conditions, to inflationary mechanisms and to political, social and
institutional perspectives. There was also a lack of concern over current account imbalances
and their correction, and a major problem which the EMU now faces is how to correct those
imbalances without resort to long periods of austerity.
We now turn to the policy remedies which are currently under discussion, which we argue
will be ineffectual and indeed likely to be damaging. This is followed by an outline of some
alternative policy proposals.
3. The quack remedies
The remedy to the Eurozone crisis which is currently being brought into force is embodied in
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
(European Union, 2012) (hereafter referred to as the Treaty) of which the ‘fiscal compact’ is
the central part, and the associated so-called ‘six pack’ of policy measures.1 The argument
here is that the fiscal compact is no more than a quack remedy which cannot work in its own
terms and will bring considerable economic damage, and could be more accurately labelled a
‘fiscal suicide pact’.
The essential features of the ‘fiscal compact’ for the discussion here are:
(i) The imposition of a ‘structural budget deficit’ rule such that that notion of budget
deficit does not exceed 0.5 per cent of GDP. Under Article 1 ‘the budgetary position of the
general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus’ and this is
interpreted as ‘the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-
specific medium-term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a
lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The
Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term
objective. The time-frame for such convergence will be proposed by the European
Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks.’
(ii) A stricter policy imposed on countries with debt ratio exceeding 60 per cent of GDP.
The Treaty (following the Six Pact) makes it ‘possible to open an EDP [excessive deficit
procedure] on the basis of the debt criterion. Member States with government debt ratios in
excess of 60% of GDP should reduce this ratio in line with a numerical benchmark, which
implies a decline of the amount by which their debt exceeds the threshold at a rate in the
order of 1/20th per year over three years. If they do not, they could be placed in EDP
depending on the assessment of all relevant factors and taking in particular into account the
influence of the cycle on the pace of debt reduction.’ (Article 4). The precise impact of this
would depend on the rate of nominal growth, and the imposition of the EDP is possible rather
than mandatory. However, in a slow growth economy with a debt ratio of say 120 per cent of
GDP, this approach would involve a budget surplus of the order of 3 per cent of GDP (and a
primary surplus which was substantial greater when interest payments on debt considered).
(iii) The deficit requirement is to be written into a country’s national constitution or
equivalent. ‘The rules set out … shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting
Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to
be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The
Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism … on the
basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, concerning in
particular the nature, size and time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken, also in the
case of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence of the institutions
responsible at national level for monitoring compliance with the rules set out … Such
correction mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments.’ (Article
3.2).
The ‘fiscal compact’ could be viewed as a development of the Stability and Growth Pact in
which the intention to balance the budget deficit over the cycle is superseded with a balanced
structural deficit rule, with the addition of the stricter policy rule as under (ii). Further, the
sanctions for breaking the ‘fiscal compact’ are re-inforced after the failures under the
Stability and Growth Pact for the rules on budget deficits to be followed. The fascination with
a 60 per cent debt to GDP ratio remains, though there is no significance to be attached to the
figure of 60 rather than any other, and the inconsistency between a 60 per cent debt to GDP
ratio and a budget on average near balance remains. There are some exemptions from
adherence to these rules in ‘exceptional circumstances’ which: ‘refers to the case of an
unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major
impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic
downturn as set out in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the temporary
deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the
medium-term’ (Article 3.3). But ‘exceptional circumstances’, whether an event such as
financial crisis which drastically depresses demand or a major natural disaster that requires
large public expenditure to deal with the disaster, does not change the ‘structural’ levels of
public expenditure nor the ‘structural’ tax revenues (based on the level of potential output, as
indicated below), and hence would not change the structural budget position.
The writing of requirements on the achievement of a structural balanced budget into the
national constitution or equivalent has two points of significance. First, it embeds economic
policy into the constitution whereas ideas on appropriate economic policy are not unchanging
over time. It seems a folly to incorporate ideas what some, but no means all, think are
appropriate policies into a document which is difficult to change, especially when those ideas
are mistaken. It can also be seen as an attempt to tie the hands of the electorate and future
governments on economic policies – what is the point of a party presenting a manifesto
committed to raising public expenditure when the constitutional court would rule the
implementation of such a commitment illegal.
Second, the implementation of a balanced structural budget requirement will be made
difficult by disputes over the measurement of the structural budget position. The
implementation of a requirement that there be a balanced annual budget (as is the case with
the European Union itself) does not face such difficulty as the annual budget outcome can be
readily measured, though it is the ex post annual budget, which can be measured but not the
ex ante budget. The structural budget is ‘structural’ public expenditure (that is some ‘normal’
level of expenditure excluding any one-off forms of expenditure) less the tax revenues, which
would be generated from the ‘normal’ set of tax rates when the economy operates at some
‘average’ level (which will be described as ‘potential output’ in line with the literature). Each
of the elements of the structural budget is a matter of estimates and dispute, and notably what
constitutes ‘potential output’.
The preamble to the Treaty notes the ‘European Commission's intention to present further
legislative proposals for the euro area concerning, in particular, ex ante reporting of debt
issuance plans, economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for Member
States under an excessive deficit procedure as well as the coordination of major economic
policy reform plans of Member States’ (p. 3). Under Article 5, ‘A Contracting Party that is
subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the Treaties on which the European Union is
founded shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a
detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to
ensure an effective and durable correction of its excessive deficit.’
Within the Treaty, ‘structural reforms’ are not defined. But there can be little doubt as to what
is in mind. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Mario Draghi, President of the ECB
stated that the most important structural reforms were ‘first is the product and services
markets reform. And the second is the labour market reform which takes different shapes in
different countries. In some of them one has to make labour markets more flexible and also
fairer than they are today. In these countries there is a dual labour market: highly flexible for
the young part of the population where labour contracts are three-month, six-month contracts
that may be renewed for years. The same labour market is highly inflexible for the protected
part of the population where salaries follow seniority rather than productivity’.2 This echoes
the sentiments, which have been repeatedly expressed by the European Central Bank in their
Monthly Bulletin. For example, writing in December 2009, ECB (2009) argued that “With
regard to structural reforms, most estimates indicate that the financial crisis has reduced the
productive capacity of the euro area economies, and will continue to do so for some time to
come. In order to support sustainable growth and employment, labour market flexibility and
more effective incentives to work will be needed. Furthermore, policies that enhance
competition and innovation are also urgently needed to speed up restructuring and investment
and to create new business opportunities” (p. 7). The nature of the intended ‘structural
reforms’ can be also seen by reference to those imposed on Greece in terms of privatisation
and labour market ‘reforms’ (notably drastic reduction of minimum wage)3.
Anti-democratic
All tiers of government operate subject to a budget constraint in the sense that expenditure
(current and capital) minus revenue has to be covered by borrowing, and for many tiers of
government limits are placed on the scale of borrowing (e.g. limited to cover capital
expenditure, subject to approval by higher tier of government). The limits on borrowing may
be imposed by ‘higher authority’ (e.g. national government over local government) or may be
self-imposed. Placing such limits on borrowing is not inherently undemocratic, and depends
where the effective decision-making lies. The features of the ‘fiscal compact’, which are
troublesome in this regard, are, first, the ways in which policy decisions on being imposed on
national governments, and most clearly this has been the case for Greece already, but further
the Treaty seeks to impose a specific range of policy decisions (‘structural reforms’) as a
condition of membership of EMU. Second, the writing of the ‘fiscal compact’ conditions into
national constitutions unnecessarily binds future governments and future perspective
governments with regard to issues of taxation and public expenditure.
It must be questioned whether economic policies should be embedded into constitutions or
quasi-constitutional legislation, which limit the necessary flexibility to change economic
policies as conditions and ideas on policies change. The ideas of ‘independent central banks’
and of ‘balanced structural budgets’ are not universal panaceas and indeed many of us would
argue that the idea of ‘independent central banks’ is highly problematic. It is also an idea,
which could be viewed as a current fashion whose attraction is fading. If an economic policy
is to be given the force of law, it should be capable of precise definition such that whether the
policy has been implemented can be accurately judged. Further, it should be a policy which is
capable of being achieved. In the following two sections it is first argued that the idea of
‘structural budget’ is ambiguous and correspondingly a ‘structural budget position’ cannot be
exactly measured. Second, it is argued that a balanced structural budget is often not
achievable – that is a budget which is balanced when the economy is operating at potential
output.
The ambiguity of the structural budget
A structural budget deficit (which appears to be left without a precise definition in the ‘fiscal
compact’, and lacking any clear indication of the methodology to be used in its estimation)
can be viewed as the deficit which would result from the application of current tax rates
(where here transfer payments are treated as negative taxes) and prevailing public
expenditure levels if the economy were operating at some ‘normal’ level of output, which has
come to be linked with the level of ‘potential output’. We put inverted commas around
‘potential output’ to signify that this term is used in a specific way in this literature as
explained below, and does not correspond to the everyday usage of the term potential which
would signify capability and capacity. We use the term structural budget deficit (SBD) below
though cyclically adjusted budget deficit is also used in the ‘fiscal compact’ and elsewhere,
and the two are treated as synonymous. Thus the structural budget deficit (SBD) is given by:
(1) SBD = G* – t(Y*)
where G* is underlying (‘structural’) level of government consumption and investment, t as
tax function relating to prevailing tax rates with income transfers regarded as negative
taxation and Y* ‘potential output’. There would generally be some issues over exact measures
of G* as to elements, which could be regarded as temporary or discretionary and hence not
included. In a similar vein, there would be issues over the tax function to be used to reflect
prevailing tax rates – for example, with an income tax system involving tax free allowances
and tax rates which vary with the level of income, what is assumed about the adjustments of
the tax free allowances and levels of taxable income at which tax rates change in the face of
inflation and changing aggregate income levels. Here we leave those issues on one side to
focus on the more major issues.
There are two key major measurement issues here, and the interaction of them (combined
with measurement issues over ‘potential output’) generate considerable ambiguity over the
measurement of structural budget deficit such that it is not a suitable concept to embed in
law.
The first is that a structural budget deficit is a hypothetical calculation and the question as to
whether a consistent estimate of the SBD can be made (for some measure of potential
output). The difficulty here can be readily seen by reference to the national accounts
relationship which is here written as:
(2) G – T = S – I + M – X
Where G is government expenditure, T tax revenue, S private savings, I private investment, M
imports and X exports (including net income). In terms of outturns, a balanced budget with
the left hand side equal to zero would require the right hand side to be similarly equal to zero.
Suppose the SBD in conditions appertaining at time t was calculated as equal to α. For 
reasons of consistency and sustainability this would mean that:
(3) S1* - I1* + M1* - X1* = α 
Where a * after variable signifies the level of the variable which would correspond to
‘potential output’, e.g. S* is intended level of savings which would be forthcoming at
potential output.
Now consider the case where the policy intention is to change the SBD through changes in
tax rates and levels of public expenditure, and the target is β. Then it not only would SBD =
β, but the following equation would also need to hold: 
(4) S2* - I2* + M2* - X2* = β 
This would be possible if there were relevant changes in ‘structural’ savings, investment,
imports and exports, e.g. if for example intentions to save diminished between (3) and (4) (in
the case of α > β). This could arise with a strong form of Ricardian equivalence – the 
intention to reduce a structural budget deficit would be exactly matched by corresponding
changes in private expenditure.
The second issue relates to the concept of ‘potential output’ itself. It must first be said that
the term ‘potential output’ is used in a number of different ways which need to be
distinguished, and that it is a theoretical notion for which there may not be a counterpart in
the real world. Further, any estimation of ‘potential output’ (for a given definition) is
inevitably backward looking in the sense of using past data, but the measure of ‘potential
output’ which is relevant for policy is the current and future levels.
The term ‘potential output’ is generally linked with the supply-side of the economy. In
common usage the term potential would suggest some form of maximum output. When we
speak of someone’s potential we are thinking of the most they could achieve or be capable of.
In economic terms ‘potential output’ can be linked with productive capacity. As such
‘potential output’ could be interpreted as the (sustainable) physical capacity output, though
more usually some notion of costs would be involved such as the level of production at which
costs would start to rise ‘sharply’. This approach to ‘potential output’ is closely related to
some upper limit to the level of output. However, the notion of ‘potential output’ which is
common in the current dominant paradigm in macroeconomics, that is the ‘new consensus in
macroeconomics’ is more akin to some average level of output around which the economy
fluctuates, and more recently has tended to be aligned with the level of output at which
inflation would be constant.
It is also apparent that the estimation of ‘potential output’ requires data – that is the
estimation can only be conducted after the event. It is only if past estimates of potential
output can be used to project forward future potential output can estimates of potential output
be derived. As output tends to grow over time, this would clearly involve not only scaling
potential output against actual output, but also deriving estimates of the growth of potential
output. This can only be highly speculative in a world of uncertainty where the future cannot
be readily foretold from the past.
The more general theoretical framework within which ‘potential output’ is cast is one of the
independence of demand and supply factors. The actual level of output is viewed as
determined in the short run by the level of aggregate demand, whereas potential output is set
on the supply side of the economy, and in general that the growth of ‘potential output’ is
unaffected by what happens on the demand side, and that the level of demand fluctuates
around potential output (and hence output gap tends to average out as zero).
It is often implicitly assumed that the economy operates on average at the potential output
level, and also that the economy should operate at that level. This is formalised in the
quadratic loss function which appears in the ‘new consensus in macroeconomics’ where the
loss function to be minimised is quadratic in inflation (minus inflation target) and output gap.
Thus inflation below target is treated in the same way in terms of welfare losses as inflation
above target, and positive output gap in same way as negative output gap. Actual output
above potential generates losses comparable to those from actual output below potential.
The zero output gap (actual equals potential output) does not in general correspond to full
employment of labour. There are two distinct reasons here. First, potential output is often
taken as akin to the average level of output (trend adjusted), and hence sometimes actual
output is above and sometimes below potential output. Full employment of labour is more
akin to a ceiling for employment and thereby economic activity: we do not see full
employment as the average level of employment (unfortunately). Second, potential output
can be taken to be the level of output, which would correspond to the employment rate that
can be deduced from the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) or non-
accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU). The NAIRU is simply the rate of
unemployment which is deemed to be consistent with constant rate of inflation, and should
not carry with it any connotation of full employment, and similarly for the NAWRU. The
estimates of the NAWRU produced by the OECD (and also labelled ‘structural
unemployment’ in OECD Economic Outlook): for example, the figures for 2007 (used to
avoid influence of financial crisis) were: France 8.4 per cent, Germany 8.4 per cent, Italy 6.3
per cent, United Kingdom 5.3 per cent and the euroarea average 7.6 per cent4, and such
figures cannot be taken to signify full employment.
The impossibility of balanced structural budget
The question here can be simply posed in terms of the conditions for a structural balanced
budget (the argument would apply with minimal adjustment to conditions for a structural
budget deficit of say 0.5 per cent of GDP). Drawing on the national accounts equations
above, the condition for a structural balanced budget would be:
(5) G – t(Y*) = S* - I* + M* - X* = 0
In other words, the savings, investment, net exports which would be forthcoming at ‘normal’
savings, investment rates and when output is at the potential level are consistent with this
equation. The ‘fiscal compact’ asserts in effect that condition is always fulfilled – at each
point in time and for every country (at least those within the Economic and Monetary Union).
The actual budget deficit could diverge from this balanced position as private aggregate
demand fluctuates – for example, through a change in the propensity to invest, leading to
change in level of output, and thereby in tax receipts. But it is asserted that if investment
demand were at some ‘normal’ level (along with savings and net export behaviour
correspondingly) then equation (5) would be satisfied.
The key argument here is that there is little reason to think that equation (7) would indeed be
satisfied. In Sawyer (2012) the argument is developed at length. One part of the argument is
that of historic experience. The occurrence of budget deficits has been the norm in many
countries without clear evidence of ‘overheating’ and the average budget has been in deficit –
indeed government debt levels of the order of 40 to 80 per cent of GDP would not have been
the norm within EMU countries without a history of budget deficits. Another part of the
argument is the absence of forces which would equate savings and investment at a high level
of economic activity. The pace of investment is closely linked with the pace of growth of the
economy: in the simple case the net investment ratio to GDP will be around the capital-output
ratio times the growth rate. Savings depends on the desire of households to save, often linked
with pension provision, and the saving by corporations. The forces at work on investment and
those on savings are rather different, and there is little reason to think that there will be
factors bringing savings and investment into line.
Structural reforms and labour market ‘flexibility’
A full evaluation of the imperatives for structural reforms, which are advocated in the Treaty
would be well beyond the length of this paper, but in any case it would require a rather more
precise definition than is currently available. Here we make three general points.
First, there is the view expressed that structural reforms will somehow lead to lower budget
deficits and to the removal of ‘excessive’ deficits. The mechanisms by which this could arise
are not spelt out, and there would seem little reason to think that an increase in labour market
‘flexibility’ would, for example lead to a lower deficit. By reference to equation (2) above, it
can be seen that the budget deficit would tend to fall if there is an increase in the desire to
invest, a decrease in the propensity to save, or an increase in net exports. Many of the
measures associated with labour flexibility (such as a more stringent approach to
unemployment benefits, reduction of minimum wages) would tend to reduce the wage share
in national income, tend to depress demand and to increase the budget deficit. The budget
deficit could then only be expected to decline (following a more ‘flexible’ labour market) if
an investment boom were stimulated. A similar argument is deployed by Tridico (2012) in
relating labour market flexibility with the financial crisis. ‘The flexibility agenda of the
labour market and the end of wage increases…diminished workers’ purchasing power. This
was partly compensated with increased borrowing opportunities and the boom of credit
consumption, all of which helped workers to maintain unstable consumption capacity.
However, in the long term, unstable consumption patterns derived from precarious job
creation, job instability and poor wages have weakened aggregate demand. Hence, labour
market issues such as flexibility, uneven income distribution, poor wages and the financial
crisis are two sides of the same coin.’ (p. 17)
Second, there is an underlying neo-liberal assumption that ‘structural reforms’, which are
directed towards labour market de-regulation, reduction of employment and wage protection
measures, privatisation and product market de-regulation, will have beneficial effects on the
economy concerned (and on the size of budget deficits which is the centre of policy
attention). However, that case is far from being established. For example, Glyn, Howell and
Schmitt (2006) found the evidence linking ‘various indicators of the implementation of labor
market reforms and unemployment’ (p.20) to be unconvincing. This was following up on
Baker et alia (2004, 2005) which have challenged the robustness of the findings that ‘rigidity
effects of labor market institutions explain the pattern of unemployment across developed
countries’ (p. 20-1). They conclude that ‘proponents of labor market deregulation have not
produced robust evidence of systematic positive effects of their proposed reforms on cross-
country employment performance, though this result has evidently not dimmed the
confidence with which such reforms are promoted…. Deregulationists often argue that
demonstrating any negative effect of labor market institutions on the unemployment rate is
sufficient to pare back or eliminate those institutions. In fact, since these institutions typically
provide substantial economic and social benefits, the burden of proof should be set much
higher.’
A recent OECD study (OECD, 2012) is, not surprisingly, more sympathetic to a structural
reform agenda, but concludes that ‘the benefits from reforms often take time to materialise’
though ‘concerns about possible negative short-term effects of structural reforms seem
exaggerated’. However, ‘cyclical conditions matter for the short-term effects of reforms.
There is some evidence that in “bad times”, certain labour market reforms (of unemployment
benefit systems and job protection in particular) can make the economic situation temporarily
worse. In still depressed economies, such reforms would therefore be more quickly beneficial
if carried out only once the labour market shows clear signs of recovery’. ‘In view of wide
remaining spare capacity, constrained macroeconomic policies and impaired fiscal positions
in most OECD countries, policy priority should be given to reforms that offer comparatively
strong short-term gains, especially in terms of strengthening the jobs recovery’ (OECD, 2012,
p.166)with the promotion of active labour market policies.
Third, there is a strong sense of seeking to impose a ‘one size fits all’ set of policies on
member countries under the banner of ‘structural reform’. The Treaty also speaks of
‘benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic
policy’ (Article 11). The ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature provides a strong argument that
there are major differences in institutional arrangements and policy approaches between
market capitalist economies. Amable (2003), for example, provides a five-way classification,
of which the first four are relevant for EMU: market based, Continental European capitalism,
Social Democratic economics, Southern European capitalism and Asian capitalism. The
Treaty threatens to pose ‘structural reforms’ whether or not they are appropriate to the
institutional, social and political arrangements of the country concerned. It has yet to be
established that a neo-liberal agenda is the appropriate one for all countries (and whether it
would be acceptable to the peoples of the countries).
4. The Keynesian medicine
In this section we outline what we will term as Keynesian medicine for the ills of the
eurozone – the term Keynesian is used in order to have some label and to signify that the
medicine pays much attention to the conditions of aggregate demand, to the use of budget
deficits (or surpluses) as a policy instrument to secure high employment and to avoid using
deflation as a means of resolving current account imbalances. In doing so we have to
recognize that the ideological ‘climate’ within the policy makers of the Economic and
Monetary Union is virulently anti-Keynesian (which helps explain the current predicament of
the Eurozone) and that the policies sketched below would face enormous ideological
resistance from those policy-makers, substantial political resistance because of the implied
transfer of resources and funding of national budget deficits and legal constraints arising from
the application of the Treaty of Lisbon and the German constitutional court and interpretation
of the German constitution (specifically the debt brake).
Current account imbalances
The scale of the current account imbalances has been illustrated in Figure 1. The EMU as a
whole has run a current account position close to balance. The accounting relationship which
comes from that is that broadly the surplus countries within EMU are directly or indirectly
lending to the deficit countries. This though implies that without major changes in the current
account position of EMU as a whole, reductions of the current account deficit in deficit
countries will have to be accompanied by reductions of an equivalent amount in current
account surplus of surplus countries.
A country with a current account deficit country faces intense pressures over the deficit
simply because to maintain a deficit requires borrowing from overseas or depletion of foreign
currency reserves, whereas current account surplus countries do not face the same pressures.
Keynes sought to devise a plan which would enable the adjustments to balance of payments
imbalances (in the context of a fixed exchange rate system) to take place without imposing
deflation. In the context of the Economic and Monetary Union, a change in the nominal
exchange rate of a member country (viz-a-viz other member countries) is not possible, though
changes in the real exchange rate are through changes in domestic prices and costs relative to
prices and costs in other member countries. The possible responses to a current account
deficit imbalance can be easily summarised in terms of find ways to carry on borrowing,
change real exchange rate through price adjustments, change real exchange rate through
improving (non-price) competitiveness, change imports through domestic deflation. These
responses are not mutually exclusive. What is required is an agreed EMU set of policies
which enable countries to continue to finance their trade deficit over say a five year time
horizon, with the promotion of industrial and regional policies to improve their
competitiveness and abilities to export. There would need to be a recognition for the need for
a change in relative prices between deficit countries and surplus countries, and that while
prices may need to be lower in the deficit countries, the counterpart is for prices to be higher
in surplus countries.
The challenge presently facing the EMU countries is how to resolve the present set of current
account imbalances without resorting to deflation, and then to avoid the re-occurrence of the
imbalances. It should be stressed that imbalances are a relative matter in the sense that
reducing one country’s current account deficit involves reducing another country’s surplus,
and within the context of the EMU it is likely (though not certain) that the reduction of the
surplus involved will be that of fellow EMU members. It is then likely that one EMU
country’s attempt to reduce their deficit would be frustrated if other EMU countries respond
in ways which prevents their surplus being reduced. For example, if a country with deficit
lowers domestic prices and hence their real exchange rate, but other countries respond by
similarly lowering their prices the change in the real exchange rate will be frustrated.
Fiscal policy and sectoral imbalances
There should be two basic principles underlying the approach to fiscal policy within EMU.
First, the fiscal stance should be set to enhance the levels of output and employment, and not
set in order to achieve some arbitrary balanced budget target (which we suggested above may
be unachievable anyway). This applies to national and supra national fiscal policies though it
is only the former which in operation at present. This will likely imply that not only should
fiscal policy through augmented automatic stabilisers seek to dampen down economic
fluctuations, but also that budget deficits will often be required on a long-term basis. For
those countries where there is a tendency for savings to exceed investment, there will be, as
argued above, a need for budget deficits to secure high levels of employment.
Second, there should not be any attempt to impose a ‘one size fits all’ fiscal policy on
national government in the sense of imposing the same numerical limits on the scale of
budget deficits (where a zero limit or any other). The fiscal policy and resulting budget
position should be tailored to the requirements of the country concerned: some countries will
require budget deficits whereas others may be able to operate successfully with budget
surpluses. It is also evident from above that the current account positions vary substantially
across countries, and the accounting identity in equation (2) above indicates the likelihood
that differences in current account positions will to some degree be reflected in differences in
the budget position.
There has long been the need for the development of an EMU-level fiscal policy with the
scale of the EMU budget very much larger than the current EU budget (of just over 1 per cent
of EU GDP, and with a requirement to be balanced). A significant question here is whether
the EU itself would operate the larger scale budget. The EMU would be able to run budget
deficits (or surpluses) to support the level of economic activity within the EMU. Others who
have argued for a EMU-level fiscal policy which would serve to help stabilise economic
activity across EMU have put the necessary scale of such a policy at 7½ per cent of GDP
(Commission of the European Communities, 1977), 5 per cent (Huffschmid, 2005, Chapter
16), 2 to 3 per cent of GDP (Currie, 1997; Goodhart and Smith, 1993).
An EMU-level fiscal policy should be used for stabilisation purposes for the euroarea as a
whole. A progressive tax system applied across the euroarea would serve to operate as an
automatic stabiliser. Further, an EMU-level fiscal policy would also cushion a region (or
country) against economic shocks which hit the region (or country). An income tax system,
which is proportional or progressive (or even mildly regressive) will involve more tax
revenue (per capita) being raised in higher income regions than would be raised in lower
income regions. The degree to which fiscal transfers between countries are involved would
depend on the progressivity of the tax system and the structure of public expenditure
undertaken from the EMU-level budget. These fiscal transfers would serve to re-distribute
spending power, and could go somewhere to easing current account imbalances. An EMU-
level fiscal policy must involve the ability of EMU to levy taxes in its own right to help
underpin borrowing by EMU. The relationship between EMU as a fiscal authority and the
ECB as the central bank would be comparable to that between a national government and its
central bank in terms of the support which the central bank can provide to fiscal policy and
the ability of government to borrow.
Central Bank
We have argued elsewhere (Arestis and Sawyer, 2006) that the policy arrangements for the
ECB currently have a range of drawbacks and problems. There is an urgent need to
reformulate the position and role of the ECB in a manner which promotes employment and
economic activity. Here we advocate three major elements of such a reformulation.
The first is to end the independence of the ECB and to integrate the ECB into a set of
democratic policy making procedures. The ECB would retain charge of operational matters
such as the implementation of interest rate decisions but would co-ordinate its decisions with
other monetary and fiscal authorities. Whilst the ECB has been independent in the sense of a
political independence, it has not been independent from a neo-liberal policy agenda, and it
has frequently advocated (in terms of fiscal constraints and the promotion of more ‘flexible’
labour markets and pension ‘reforms’) a neo-liberal policy agenda. The integration of ECB
into the policy-making arrangements would enable policy co-ordination which should lead to
more effective policy making. The ‘independence’ of the ECB would appear to preclude co-
operation and co-ordination between the different bodies responsible for aspects of
macroeconomic policies. Yet, in a world of multiple objectives (including high levels of
economic activity and employment, financial stability, inflation etc.) there is a need for
multiple instruments, which are operated by different authorities, and where there should be
some co-ordination.
The second arises from the dominance of inflation targeting as the prime policy objective.
We have pointed elsewhere (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008, 2010c) to the general failures of
inflation targeting, and also that the ECB has not in generally achieved the price stability
target (interpreted as inflation between 0 and 2 per cent) albeit that the inflation rate has
tended to be just over 2 per cent. A more significant issue has been the differential inflation
rates between countries and the inability of monetary policy to address those differences in
inflation rate. Further, monetary policy has had a perverse effect in that with a single policy
nominal interest rate leads to lower real interest rates in higher inflation countries – exactly
the reverse of the way in which inflation targeting is intended to work whereby real interest
rate is high when inflation is high with the intention of damping down demand.
The pursuit of financial stability should become the prime objective of the ECB (and other
central banks). This argument is based, in part, on the relative frequency of financial
instability and the significant costs associated with financial crisis, which are several orders
of magnitude greater than any costs of inflation. The instruments of policy have to be further
developed. The key argument here though is that the pursuit of financial stability should
become the prime focus of the ECB.
Third, the relationships between the ECB and national governments (and other fiscal
authorities which may be developed) have to become akin to that between national central
banks and the central government in most countries. The ECB should on all occasions stand
ready to operate as ‘lender of last resort’ (which at present is allowable for the ECB but not
compulsory. It should always accept the bonds and bills issued by national governments
(within EMU) as part of open market operations in the way in which a national central bank
would always accept the bonds of its government. It should also stand ready to directly lend
to national governments (in exchange for bonds in euros of that government) if required. The
general proposition is that the ECB should support the fiscal policies determined by EMU
national governments, whether or not those policies involve deficits of which the ECB
disapproves.
Inflation and competitiveness policies
Finding a way of effectively constraining inflation without resorting to deflationary measures
has been a recurring issue throughout the post war period. It has been indicated above and
more extensively argued elsewhere (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008, 2012) that inflation targeting
in ineffectual and alternatives have to be developed. However, as noted above, within the
EMU there had been relatively low inflation but the inflation target of 0 to 2 per cent was
frequently missed albeit by a small margin, and more significantly for EMU there were
persistent differences of inflation between member countries. Within EMU it is argued here
that mechanisms have to be developed, which will in effect co-ordinate wage developments
and prices across EMU countries. A key aspect here is that the evolution of competitiveness
between EMU member countries. It is clear that monetary policy cannot address differential
inflation problems.
There is then the need to develop wage and price co-ordination mechanisms at the EMU level
through which not only the general pace of inflation can be addressed but more significantly
the similarity of the pace of inflation across countries be ensured.
5. Concluding remarks
In this chapter, it has been argued that the roots of the on-going euro crisis come from the
ways in which the Economic and Monetary Union was constructed, and the failure of that
construction to address the current account imbalances between the member countries. It has
considered the proposed Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and ‘fiscal
compact’, and argued that the fiscal conditions which the Treaty seeks to impose are
inadequately defined and the target of a balanced structural budget is unachievable and
attempts to reach the conditions will impose continent wide austerity. The final section has
outlined the elements of a Keynesian alternative which can restore prosperity to the EMU.
Endnotes
1 The ‘six pack’ entered into force on 13 December 2011, and involved five Regulations and
one Directive (hence ‘six pack’) which constitutes EU secondary law. It applies to all 27
member states, with some specific rules for EMU members. The six-pack covers not only
fiscal surveillance, but also macroeconomic surveillance under the new Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure. The crucial aspects of the ‘six pack’ appear in the Treaty and are
discussed under that head. For further information see
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm
2 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120224.en.html, accessed 20th
March 2012.
3 See European Commission (2012) for discussion of the measures imposed on Greece.
4 Figures taken from OECD, Economic Outlook, Statistical Annexe, December 2010
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